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In February 2012 a reform of the Spanish labour market was approved, which modified 
some of the most important aspects of the institutional framework, affecting key elements, 
such as the degree of centralisation of the collective bargaining system and dismissal 
costs and procedures.1 Although some of these changes are structural and will require a 
long period to produce their full effect, it is already worth attempting to identify labour 
market developments that may be related to this labour reform.2
This article analyses recent developments in the main labour market variables (employ-
ment, unemployment and wages) to isolate the possible impact of the reform from other 
factors that may have driven these developments, including notably the adverse cyclical 
and employment situation in which it is being applied. The results are subject to a high 
degree of uncertainty, as a consequence of the brevity of the period elapsed since the 
reform was approved. Continued monitoring will be needed to confirm the evidence found 
and to detect any new patterns of behaviour.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. The next section briefly describes the con-
tent of the 2012 reform, while the third section analyses recent wage developments and 
the changes detected in collective bargaining. The fourth section analyses developments 
in employment and unemployment, along with job creation and destruction flows. The fifth 
section summarises the main conclusions.
Royal Decree-Law 3/2012, approved in February 2012, included a broad set of changes to 
labour market institutions.3 With regard to collective bargaining, and in order to increase 
the degree of decentralisation in the system, it was established that firm-level agreements 
should prevail in a broad set of areas (basic wage, supplements, overtime remuneration, 
and the distribution of working hours), with contradictory clauses in industry-level agree-
ments being ineffective. Also, in order to increase firms’ internal flexibility, the possibilities 
were widened for opting out from the terms and conditions contained in the agreement in 
force, as well as for unilateral changes to working conditions that exceed the minimum 
levels established in the collective agreement. Finally, to encourage faster renegotiation, 
the reform established a maximum limit of one year4 for the effectiveness of an agreement 
after its termination.
In the area of dismissal costs and procedures, a number of measures were taken. On one 
hand, the economic grounds for dismissal were redefined, establishing objective circum-
stances that justify termination of contract. In particular, it was determined that termination 
is justified if the firm reports losses (or expects to) or suffers three consecutive quarters of 
Introduction
A brief description of the 
content of the 2012 labour 
reform
1  For a description of the institutional framework existing in the Spanish labour market before the crisis, see Es-
trada, Izquierdo and Lacuesta (2009).
2  The Ministry of Employment and Social Security has recently published an analysis of the impact of the labour re-
form, which is available at http://www.empleo.gob.es/es/destacados/HOME/impacto_reforma_laboral/index.htm.
3 Eventually approved as Law 3/2012 in July.
4  From 8 July 2012, the date of publication of Law 3/2012 in the BOE. This period can, however, be extended by 
agreement between the parties.
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year-on-year declines in sales or revenues. On the other hand, the amount of compensa-
tion payable in the event of unjustified dismissal  was reduced; for objective and discipli-
nary dismissals it was set at 33 days per year of service, subject to a maximum of 24 
months’ pay (as against 45 days and a maximum of 42 months’ pay previously). As for 
dismissal procedures, the need for administrative authorisation for collective dismissals 
was eliminated, as was the obligation on the part of the firm to pay wages for the period 
between the time of notification of dismissal and final judicial resolution.
In relation to hiring possibilities, a new type of permanent contract, called an “entrepre-
neurs’ contract”, was introduced for firms with fewer than 50 employees, with a probation 
period that has been extended to one year and various fiscal incentives. In addition, some 
of the terms and conditions of the training and apprenticeship contract and those relating 
to part-time hiring were made more flexible.
Finally, although this was not a legislative change, it is worth remembering the Agreement 
for Employment and Collective Bargaining (AENC-2012) signed by the social agents at the 
beginning of 2012. This agreement included recommendations for wage increases of 0.5% 
in 2012, 0.6% in 2013 and between 0.6% and 1.5% in 2014.
The various modifications to the regulation of collective bargaining, the purpose of which, 
as mentioned above, was to make it more decentralised, to increase firms’ internal flexibil-
ity and to accelerate the renewal of agreements, should enable employment conditions 
(wage and non-wage conditions) to be better adapted to the specific situation of firms and 
facilitate a more balanced adjustment between wages, employment and working hours.5 
The changes introduced into dismissal costs, which also have an influence on the wage 
bargaining process, can be expected to have operated in the same direction. Specifically, 
in accordance with the situation of the labour market since the start of the crisis, this set 
of changes should have led to wage moderation, which should, moreover, have been as-
sisted by the AENC, signed in early 2012.
The left-hand panel of Chart 1 shows the recent developments in compensation per em-
ployee in the market economy,6 according to QNA information, and in labour costs esti-
mated by the quarterly labour costs survey (ETCL). In recent quarters there has been an 
intensification of the wage moderation process, with a year-on-year decline in compensa-
tion per employee at the beginning of this year, according to the QNA. The information 
supplied by the ETCL shows somewhat sharper wage moderation since 2012 Q2.7 Given 
the recent inflation developments, both indicators reflect falls in wages in real terms in 
recent quarters.
That said, in a situation of sharply deteriorating activity and employment, it is difficult to 
determine which part of this labour cost behaviour stems from the cyclical situation and 
which part may be attributed to the effects of the reform. To try to distinguish between 
the impacts of these two factors, a wage equation has been estimated in which wage 
Changes in labour costs
5  For an analysis of the impact of the level of decentralisation in collective bargaining on the functioning of the 
labour market, see Jimeno and Thomas (2011).
6  It is important to isolate the effects of the labour reform on the wage formation process in the private sector of 
the economy from the direct effect on the average compensation of the whole economy arising from the cut in 
public-sector wages. For this reason, the analysis is focused on the market economy.
7  In this case, the evolution of labour costs in the non-agricultural market economy has been calculated by ag-
gregating the sectoral ETCL information in accordance with the weights available in the Harmonised Labour Cost 
Index (ICLA).
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increases are related to their traditional determinants: unemployment, inflation and pro-
ductivity.8 Negative values for the residuals of this equation would indicate that the slow-
down observed in compensation per employee had gone beyond what could be attributed 
to changes in its determinants.9 Thus, the evolution of these residuals in the period before 
and after the reform can be interpreted as an approximation of the possible effect of the 
legislative changes on the wage formation process. As seen in the right-hand panel of 
Chart 1, from 2010 the residuals have negative values, following the high positive values 
observed in the first phase of the crisis, and in absolute terms their value has increased in 
the most recent period, especially in the first two quarters of 2013. A similar analysis based 
on ETCL data points to a somewhat more intense process of wage moderation, which 
started in 2012 Q2. These results, however, must be interpreted with due caution owing to 
the small number of observations available following the reform, and developments in the 
coming quarters need to be monitored.
When wage developments are analysed in greater detail, it is important to consider the 
results of collective bargaining. The upper panel of Table 1 shows wage increases ac-
cording to the agreement data for the period 2009-2013. The average wage increase is 
broken down into the initially agreed rate and the revision made as a consequence of 
possible activation of indexation clauses. It can be seen that the average wage increase, 
when the impact of the clauses has been included, exceeds two percentage points be-
tween 2009 and 2011, a slightly higher rate than that recorded by the CPI over this period 
as a whole, despite the intensity of the job destruction taking place during these years 
and the collective bargaining agreement in effect, which was signed in 2010 and tried to 
promote wage moderation.
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
a Gross data.
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8  Specifically, past inflation, the unemployment rate and productivity. The regression is estimated from 1981 to 
2012 Q1 for the market economy as a whole, in such a way that the changes in wage determination following this 
quarter do not affect the estimation. Inflation is measured by the 12-month increase in the CPI in December of 
the previous year, since this is the reference used most in the wage formation process, and productivity is the 
year-on-year increase in this variable in the market economy. The estimated coefficients are those expected and 
are significant.
9  This analysis does not take into account the increase in non-wage costs for firms arising from the 5% increase 
in the maximum contribution bases at the beginning of 2013.
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From 2012, however, a clear reduction is seen in the average increase in wage rates, which 
stood at 1.3% in 2012, more than one percentage point below the inflation rate in Decem-
ber of the previous year, which is often taken as a reference in collective bargaining. Ac-
cording to the data available for 2013,10 average wage rates in the first eight months of the 
year grew at a rate of 0.6%, despite the rise in inflation at the end of 2012 as a conse-
quence of the rises in administered prices and indirect taxes. Newly signed agreements 
(middle panel of Table 1), a more up-to-date indicator of the possible effects of the reform 
on collective bargaining results, reflected even more moderate wage increases, of 0.4%.
In the area of wage indexation, the effects have to date been weaker. The percentage of 
workers covered by indexation clauses has declined significantly in recent years, but re-
mains above 40%. However, it should be noted that the effective impact of indexation 
clauses was smaller in 2012, this being related to the fact that a high percentage of the 
agreements signed would have included a more flexible definition, in line with the recom-
mendations of the AENC. This greater flexibility has reduced the percentage of clauses 
eventually activated and their aggregate impact on wage developments. It remains to be 
confirmed whether this effect is permanent in nature or has been driven by temporary fac-
tors such as the adverse cyclical situation.
The same is true of the progress made in relation to the degree of decentralisation in the 
wage determination system. The information available shows a slight rise in the coverage 
of firm-level agreements in 2012, which was marginally above its 2009 level (see bottom 
panel of Table 1). In addition, the average size of firms that have their own agreement has 
barely changed and remains large, so that the greater possibilities for decentralisation do 
not seem to have been sufficiently exploited by smaller firms, which did not usually nego-
tiate firm-level collective agreements before the reform. However, it should not be concluded 
SOURCE: Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social.
a With information until August 2013.
b Data of 2011 and 2012 with information until January 2013.
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total collective bargaining agreements
    CPI (Dec) 0.8 3.0 2.4 2.9 –
    Wage rise without clause (a) 2.3 1.5 2.0 1.1 0.6
    Clause (a) 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.2 –
    Wage rise with clause (a) 2.2 2.2 2.3 1.3 –
    % of workers with clause (b) 59.1 47.1 45.3 41.6 42.6
Newly signed agreements (a) (b)
    Wage rise without clause 1.7 1.2 1.3 0.7 0.4
    Clause 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.2 –
    Wage rise with clause 1.7 1.6 1.5 0.9 –
Firm-level agreements (a)
    Workers affected (as % of total) 9.6 8.6 8.7 9.5 4.9
    Average size (no. of workers) 258 243 267 301 230
WAGE RISE ACCORDING TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 
  
TABLE 1 
10  When interpreting these data, it should be taken into account that the agreement data for 2013 incorpo-
rate an important technical change in their compilation, which leads to a significant decline in their repre-
sentativeness.
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from this result that the greater possibilities for decentralisation are having no effect on 
collective bargaining. The mere fact that, following the reform, it is possible to negotiate 
firm level agreements may be affecting the results of wage bargaining at the sectoral 
level. Indeed, the latest data available show that sector-level wage rates are tending to 
converge with the lower rates agreed in firm-level agreements, which was not usually the 
case previously.
Finally, the limitation to one year of the period during which an agreement may remain in 
effect after its termination has significantly speeded up the rate of renegotiation of collec-
tive agreements in 2013. The greater progress made in bargaining has resulted in a rise in 
the number of workers affected by newly signed agreements during the first eight months 
of the year to 1.3 million, which was significantly higher than the average number in the 
same period of previous years (around 800,000). Given the delay with which new agree-
ments are usually registered, a significant rise in bargaining can be expected in the coming 
months, which should help identify more precisely the magnitude of the changes occurring 
in the collective bargaining system.
As for the analysis of the greater possibilities for internal flexibility fostered by the recent 
legal changes, Table 2 shows, in accordance with the information provided by the special 
module included in the labour situation survey (ECL),11 the percentage of employment ac-
counted for by firms that have opted out from the terms and conditions of the agreement 
between 2010 and 2012. Since 2010, opt-outs from the terms of the agreement have 
barely changed, remaining within a range of around 5%-6% of employees. By contrast, it 
seems that the possibilities for making substantial changes to employment conditions are 
being heavily used by firms. The data available (see final column of Table 2) indicate that a 
significant proportion of firms, accounting for 12.1% of total employment, have had re-
course to this tool for internal flexibility in 2012. In any event, this instrument has been 
used mainly by large firms, while among small firms the rate of use is very low.
Looking ahead, it would be worth carrying out an in-depth analysis of the reasons underly-
ing the differences in behaviour according to the size of the firm, since the use of these 
SOURCE: Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social.
a Authors' calculations based on microdata from the ECL.
Opt-outs 2010 Opt-outs 2011 Opt-outs 2012
Substantial changes 
2012
As a percentage of employees
Total 6.8 5.2 5.7 12.1
    1-10 employees 4.3 4.3 0.9 4.7
    11-50 employees 6.4 4.4 2.6 8.8
    51-250 employees 8.4 6.1 5.8 14.1
    Over 250 employees 10.5 7.3 12.7 20.2
OPT-OUTS AND SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES, BY SIZE OF FIRM (a) 
  
TABLE 2 
11  We are grateful to the Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social for giving us access to this database, which 
is based on a questionnaire completed by firms on a quarterly basis. Since February 2012 an official register 
has been available of opt-outs from collective agreements, although this information does not allow the figure 
for opt-outs to be compared with that observed previously.
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possibilities can be crucial to limiting employment losses. ECL data have been used to 
analyse the differences in the behaviour of employment at firms that declared they had 
opted out in 2010 and 2011. The results obtained indicate that the firms that used this op-
tion in either of these years had a better record in terms of level of employment in 2012 
than those that did not (around 4.4% higher),12 which shows the role that internal flexibility 
measures can play in promoting employment.
One difficulty for assessing the possible impact of the reform on employment, apart from 
the limited time that has elapsed since it was introduced, is that stemming from the ad-
verse cyclical situation in the period analysed, which is marked by a second recession that 
began in mid-2011 and continued throughout the period analysed following the reform. 
The fall in employment intensified in this period, reaching its highest rate in the initial 
months of 2012 and slowing thereafter. In turn, the rate of unemployment increased con-
tinuously to peak at 27.2% in 2013 Q1. In Q2, the slowing of the fall in employment, along 
with the acceleration in the decline in the labour force, permitted a reduction in the rate of 
unemployment, which stood at 26.3%. It should be noted, however, that part of the dete-
rioration of the labour market situation during this period has been caused by the fall in 
public-sector employment in the context of the ongoing budgetary consolidation plans. If 
this effect is stripped out, the behaviour of market economy employment does not exhibit 
great differences between 2011 and 2012, with average quarterly declines of slightly above 
1% in both years.
Starting from the cyclical context described, one might ask to what extent the relationship 
between activity and employment may have changed following the regulatory changes 
introduced by the reform. As above in the case of wages, a simple way of analysing pos-
sible changes in this relationship is to estimate a regression between two variables and to 
analyse the residuals in the period after the reform. In particular, two regressions are esti-
mated, in which the rate of change of economic activity is related to the change in the rate 
of unemployment and employment growth, respectively, a relationship that is commonly 
known as Okun’s Law.13
Chart 2 shows the residuals of these equations for the most recent period. In the case 
of the equation relating unemployment and activity, negative residuals are observed 
since 2010, which are larger in absolute terms in the latest quarters, partly reflecting 
the recent decline in the labour force. In the case of the equation relating employment 
and activity, the residuals were negative until 2012 Q1, reflecting a sharper rate of job 
destruction than would have been expected given the fall in activity. From that date, 
however, the negative residuals became smaller, turning slightly positive in the first two 
quarters of 2013.
This analysis points to somewhat better than expected behaviour by employment in the 
private sector, at least in the most recent period,14 which is in line with the slowdown ob-
The evolution of 
employment and 
unemployment
12  This result is obtained from a regression using panel data, in which the effect of the opt-out is estimated after 
controlling for the presence of aggregate trends in the economy, so as to strip out the aggregate cyclical situa-
tion and individual firm-level trends that strip out the specific situation of firms.
13  To ensure that the evolution of the public sector does not distort the results the estimation is carried out using 
the employment and GVA of the market economy. This cannot be done for the unemployment rate, which is not 
defined for the market economy, so the regressor in this regression is GDP.
14  When the previous regressions are estimated with parameters that change over time a recent increase in the 
constant of this regression is observed, while the elasticity of employment to GVA is reduced. However, it is too 
soon to know if these changes are statistically significant.
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served in productivity growth and may be reflecting the effects of wage moderation on 
employment. As in the case of wages, it is still very premature to draw final conclusions, 
although it is worth stressing that other studies, which use different approximations, tend 
to show similar results that relate the wage moderation caused by the labour reform to 
improved employment behaviour.15
However, to analyse the effects of the reform on employment it is essential to examine 
the changes that may have occurred in the job creation and destruction processes, 
which may be done using the information provided by Labour Force Survey (EPA) flows 
data. Considering the content of the reform, one might expect the decline in dismissal 
costs to increase the rate of destruction of employment of workers with permanent con-
tracts, especially if the various internal flexibility measures were not heavily used. In turn, 
the changes in dismissal costs and wage moderation should lead to more permanent 
increases in the rate of creation of permanent employment.
Chart 3 shows the rates of job destruction and creation, approximated by the outflow from 
employment to unemployment and by the inflow to employment from unemployment, re-
spectively, along with the year-on-year growth in GVA in the market economy since 2006. 
As seen in this chart, in principle, neither of these two phenomena has displayed signifi-
cant changes in the most recent period. The rate of destruction of employment has re-
mained at high levels in recent quarters, although it has not accelerated further. For its 
part, the rate of job creation has continued to display the downward trend observed since 
the start of the crisis. In any case, it should be noted that this behaviour is also influenced 
by the sharp fall in economic activity in 2012. To control for this, a regression analysis 
similar to the one performed previously was carried out. The preliminary results do not 
show significant changes, although they suggest that the behaviour of the intensity of the 
job destruction has been similar to before 2012, while the fall in job creation observed 
since the start of the crisis has been curbed.
15  Specifically, De Cea and Dolado (2013) show that growth rates of 0.3%-1.3% of GDP would suffice to increase 
employment in net terms, provided that the current wage moderation is maintained. BBVA (2013) estimates 
that the 2012 wage moderation saved the destruction of some 60,000 jobs in the short term, and had a medi-
um-term impact of some 300,000 fewer jobs destroyed. Finally, the evaluation by the Ministry of Employment 
also finds that the behaviour of employment in the most recent period was even better than would be attribut-
able to wage moderation.
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
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In terms of the composition of employment by type of contract, the downward trend in the 
temporary employment ratio that commenced at the start of the crisis has continued, re-
ducing the ratio to 23% in 2013 Q2. This should basically be attributed to the impact of 
cyclical conditions, which again play a determining role.16 In fact, as seen in Chart 4, out-
flows from employment have continued to be dominated by workers with temporary con-
tracts, with a very slight increase in the probability of job loss in the case of permanent 
workers. For its part, the creation of permanent employment has fallen in this period, al-
though less sharply than outflows from unemployment to temporary contracts. In relation 
to hiring mechanisms, it should be stressed that the new entrepreneurs’ contract repre-
sents, to date, around 7% of the new permanent contracts entered into each month. Fi-
nally, with regard to part-time hiring, there was an acceleration in the upward path of the 
part-time employment ratio.
In relation to dismissal procedures, the information available points to an increase in the 
percentage of objective dismissals, which would have reduced the average cost of lay-
offs for economic reasons.17 In relation to collective dismissal procedures, the elimina-
tion of administrative authorisation has not increased the weight of applications for la-
bour force reduction through terminations, while the high percentages of applications for 
labour force reduction through working hours reductions and temporary suspension of 
employment recorded since 2009, when this type of procedure began to be promoted, 
continue to exist. However, as a result of the elimination of the need for administrative 
authorisation, there was a decline in the percentage of applications agreed with the 
workers’ representatives.
This article has analysed the recent evolution of the main Spanish labour market varia-
bles, and has attempted to relate this evolution to the legal changes approved in February 
last year. The analysis is subject to significant limitations. In particular, the shortness of 
Conclusions
16  A similar analysis to the above-mentioned ones to eliminate the cyclical component of the recent developments 
in the temporary employment ratio shows no significant changes in the period after the reform that may be as-
sociated with the legal changes approved.
17  The statistics available on the cost of dismissal per worker dismissed do not allow a very firm conclusion to be 
drawn, since it is not possible to separate out from the evolution of the average cost of dismissal possible 
changes over time in the composition of the dismissed workers.
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
a Year-on-year rate of change of the seasonally adjusted series.
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the period that has elapsed since the approval of the reform limits the data available, in a 
context in which distinguishing the possible impact of the reform from that of cyclical fac-
tors arising from the adverse economic situation is essential. Also, some of the changes 
that are structural in nature will only fully manifest their effects over the medium term, 
when agents have internalised the new institutional framework.
The incipient results point to a deepening of the wage moderation process following the 
approval of the 2012 reform, which may be starting to reflect greater sensitivity of the wage 
determination process to the specific situation of firms. That said, no significant increase 
in the degree of decentralisation of the bargaining system has yet been seen. For its part, 
the use of the internal flexibility mechanisms that have been introduced has been concen-
trated among large firms. In relation to employment, the results tend to show a certain 
positive impact on net employment, which may be associated with the wage moderation 
observed, although the evidence is less conclusive. Finally, significant progress has not 
been seen in terms of the composition of employment flows, which continue to be domi-
nated by temporary workers.
Looking ahead, continuous monitoring of the labour market is needed in order to establish 
the degree of permanence of the patterns observed to date. In this respect, it would be 
desirable for some aspects of the statistical information to be adapted to the new situation 
created after the successive labour reforms of recent years. In particular, the information 
available on aspects such as the procedure for and effective cost of dismissals and the 
collective bargaining system needs to be expanded.
19.9.2013.
BBVA (2013). Revista Situación España, 2013 Q2.
DE CEA, P., and J.J. DOLADO (2013). Output Growth Thresholds for Job Creation and Unemployment Reduction in 
Spain, Universidad Carlos III, mimeo.
ESTRADA, A., M. IZQUIERDO and A. LACUESTA (2009). “The functioning of the labour market and unemployment 
growth in Spain”, Economic Bulletin, July, Banco de España, pp. 104-121.
JIMENO, J. F., and C. THOMAS (2011). Collective Bargaining, Firm Heterogeneity and Unemployment, Documento de 
Trabajo 1131, Banco de España.
MINISTERIO DE EMPLEO Y SEGURIDAD SOCIAL (2013). Informe de evaluación del impacto de la reforma laboral.
REFERENCES
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
a As a percentage of population of origin. Four-quarter average.
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
  2006   2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 FROM TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT 
 FROM PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT 
  
% 
% 
EMPLOYMENT OUTFLOWS (a) 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
2006   2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 TO TEMPORARY EMPLOYENT 
 TO PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT 
% 
EMPLOYMENT INFLOWS (a) 
EMPLOYMENT FLOWS BY TYPE OF CONTRACT: PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY CHART 4

